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Disentangling an Elusive Relationship: How Democratic Value Orientations Affect Political Trust in 
Different Regimes 
Marlene Mauk1  
Abstract 
The question whether democratic values are on the rise or in decline has received much attention in political-culture 
research. Yet, few scholars have studied the consequences either of these trends has for political trust. Although 
political trust has long been attributed a central role for the functioning and stability of any political system, we still 
know little about the relationship between citizens’ value orientations and political trust. Recent advances have 
furthered the discussion by conceptualizing this relationship to be conditional on the respective country’s level of 
democracy; yet this literature does not take into account findings that demonstrate citizens rarely have an accurate 
grasp of their country’s democratic quality. Integrating the two strands of literature, this contribution suggests a 
relationship between democratic value orientations and political trust that is universally contingent on citizens’ 
perceptions of democratic quality. Testing this proposition for over one hundred democracies and autocracies, it finds 
that democratic value orientations decrease political trust whenever citizens perceive their regime’s democratic quality 
as lacking and increase political trust whenever citizens perceive their political regime as being of high democratic 
quality. In contrast, the actual level of democracy plays no role for the effect of democratic value orientations on 
political trust. 
Keywords 
autocracies, democracies, democratic quality, democratic values, political culture, political trust, regime support 
Introduction 
A recent academic as well as public debate has raised the question whether democratic values are on the rise or in 
decline. Although, when asked in opinion surveys, citizens across the entire globe nowadays overwhelmingly choose 
democracy as their preferred political system (Chu et al. 2016; Haerpfer and Kizilova 2014; Klingemann 2014; Letsa 
and Wilfahrt 2018; Robbins 2015; Sanborn 2014), younger birth cohorts in established democracies place less 
importance on living in a democracy than older cohorts, suggesting a gradual decline of democratic value orientations 
(Foa and Mounk 2016).1 Despite the enormous attention this debate has generated, it has yet to address one of the most 
fundamental questions: does it even matter? What are the consequences of citizens’ political value orientations? 
With value orientations being very broad and abstract concepts that are unlikely to influence behavior (Ajzen 2012), 
we need to assess their effect on more proximate attitudes such as political trust if we want to infer anything about the 
real-world consequences of both a rise and a decline of democratic values. The relationship between democratic value 
orientations and political trust, however, has continually proven to be elusive. 
Initially, pro-democratic value orientations were welcomed as bases of democratic support and thought to increase 
political trust in democracies (Almond and Verba 1963; Easton 1975). Yet, scholars in the critical-citizens tradition 
have repeatedly challenged this view, arguing that a shift toward more modern and pro-democratic values would make 
citizens more demanding of the political regime, thereby decreasing political trust (Dalton 2004; Dalton and Shin 
2014; Inglehart 1999; Klingemann 2014; Norris 2011), and the empirical evidence on how pro-democratic value 
orientations affect political trust in democracies remains inconclusive (Catterberg and 
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Moreno 2005; Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2017; Klingemann 2014; Ma and Yang 2014; Park 2013; Singh 2018). For 
autocracies, the case seems less ambiguous: scholars consent that pro-democratic value orientations should result in 
lower trust in the autocratic regime (J. Chen and Dickson 2008). Yet, empirical substantiation is still lacking. The few 
studies that analyze the relationship between pro-democratic value orientations and political trust in autocracies are 
confined to countries in East Asia (D. Chen 2017; Ma and Yang 2014; Park 2013; Shi 2001), raising doubts about the 
generalizability of their findings. What is more, despite the well-documented spread of pro-democratic values even to 
the remotest and most authoritarian regimes (e.g., Letsa and Wilfahrt 2018; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012; Welzel 
and Dalton 2017; Wu, Chang, and Pan 2016), political trust in autocracies does not appear to be in meaningful decline 
(Ma and Yang 2014; Norris 2011; Wang and Tan 2013). The relationship between citizens’ value orientations and 
political trust thus remains puzzling both in democracies and in autocracies. 
Recent advances have tried to solve this puzzle by introducing the level of democracy as a moderating variable. 
Arguing that political trust is relational, these scholars propose democratic value orientations to have a more positive 
effect on political trust in more democratic regimes (Hooghe, Marien, and Oser 2017; Huhe and Tang 2017). At the 
same time, however, another strand of recent research has pointed out that how citizens view their political regime 
does not always correspond to how political-science experts evaluate it (Kruse, Ravlik, and Welzel 2017; Mauk 2017; 
Park 2013, 2017; Pietsch 2014; Shi and Lu 2010). Picking up on the idea that citizen perceptions must not necessarily 
reflect a country’s actual level of democracy, this contribution adds to the discussion by suggesting that the 
relationship between democratic value orientations and political trust is not conditional on a country’s level of 
democracy but rather on citizens’ perceptions of democratic quality. Still conceptualizing political trust as being 
relational in nature, that is, dependent not only on citizens’ value orientations, it proposes a conditional relationship 
between democratic value orientations, perceptions of democratic quality, and political trust. Diverging from the 
previous literature, I hypothesize this conditional relationship to be independent of a country’s level of democracy and 
thus universal across regime types. 
Aiming to disentangle the elusive relationship between democratic value orientations and political trust, the 
theoretical argument laid out in the following section emphasizes both the relational nature of (political) trust and the 
potential divergence between a country’s level of democracy and citizens’ perceptions of democratic quality. Its main 
proposition is that the effect of democratic value orientations on political trust is conditional on citizens’ perceptions of 
democratic quality regardless of the type of regime people live in. Empirically, this contribution tests its propositions 
on a unique data set combining recent data from six cross-national survey projects covering more than one hundred 
democracies and autocracies around the entire globe. Using multilevel regression modeling, it shows that rather than 
actual level of democracy, citizen perceptions of democratic quality condition how democratic value orientations affect 
political trust. In doing so, it makes two central contributions. First, it substantiates the relational nature of political 
trust and thereby enhances the scholarship on critical citizens: rather than democratic value orientations alone, it is the 
combination of democratic value orientations and perceptions of lacking democratic quality that may lead to a decline 
in political trust. Second, it points out the divergence between a country’s level of democracy and citizen perceptions 
of democratic quality: while political trust is still relational, the effect of democratic value orientations proves to be 
independent of a country’s level of democracy. The analysis hence demonstrates that the relationship between citizens’ 
value orientations and their trust in the political system rests on a universal mechanism that is at work regardless of the 
nature of the political regime in which people live. 
Democratic Value Orientations and Political Trust 
Political trust, defined as citizens’ confidence that the political system, its institutions, or actors will “do what is right 
even in the absence of constant scrutiny” (Miller and Listhaug 1990, 358), is a central concept in political-culture 
research. For decades, scholars have considered political trust as essential for the smooth functioning and stability of 
the political system (Abdelzadeh, Özdemir, and van Zalk 2015; Dalton 2004; Hetherington 1998; Hutchison and 
Johnson 2011; Letki 2006; Marien and Hooghe 2011; Newton 2009; Scholz and Lubell 1998; Tyler 2011). Examining 
how democratic value orientations influence political trust in democracies and autocracies can thus help identify 
whether a possible spread or decline of democratic values will foster or hinder the functioning and stability of either 
type of regime. 
From a conceptual point of view, any kind of trust is at its core a relational concept: “A trusts B to do X” (Hardin 
2002, 9). This means that trust always entails an evaluation of the relationship between A (the subject) and B (the 
object) of trust. With regard to political trust, the subject of this relationship is the individual citizen and the object of 
this relationship is the political system, its institutions, or actors. Political trust can therefore stem from three types of 
sources: exogenous variables, that is, characteristics of the 
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individual citizen (the subject); endogenous variables, that is, characteristics of the political system, its institutions, or 
actors (the object); or the interaction of these two types of characteristics (van der Meer and Hakhverdian 2017). 
Democratic value orientations clearly are a characteristic of the individual citizen and therefore the subject of 
political trust. With regard to the effect democratic value orientations have on political trust, the literature expects 
citizens’ value orientations to set the reference points for what citizens expect from the political system (Easton 1965, 
1975; Fuchs 2009; Lipset 1959; Rokeach 1973; Williams 1968). People will then extend more trust to the political 
system if it meets these expectations. From this point of view, democratic political value orientations should be 
conducive to political trust in democracies but stifle political trust in autocracies (Breustedt and Stark 2015; Catterberg 
and Moreno 2005; J. Chen and Dickson 2008; Singh 2018). However, scholars in the critical-citizens tradition have 
pointed out that democratic value orientations may have a negative effect on political trust even in democracies 
(Dalton 2000, 2004; Norris 1999, 2011). Their argument rests on the assumption that no real-world political regime 
can ever actually meet ideal democratic standards (cf. Dahl 1971). Democratic value orientations would then set 
expectations that even democracies are bound to fall short of, prompting citizens to withdraw political trust. 
If we take these arguments seriously, both perspectives in the literature actually conceptualize political trust as being 
determined not only by democratic value orientations as a characteristic of the individual citizen alone (the subject of 
political trust). Instead, they implicitly propose that these democratic value orientations interact with a characteristic of 
the political system (the object of political trust), that is, its level of democracy: the more democratic the political 
regime is, the more positive the effect of democratic value orientations on political trust should be. In a recent 
contribution, Hooghe, Marien, and Oser (2017) explicitly argue as well as show empirically that good governance 
conditions how citizens’ democratic ideals affect political trust in European democracies. Analyzing democracies and 
autocracies in East Asia, Huhe and Tang (2017) similarly find that democratic value orientations have a more negative 
effect on political trust in autocracies (=lower level of democracy) than in democracies (=higher level of democracy). 
These scholars hence suggest that the effect of citizens’ democratic value orientations, an exogenous variable, is 
conditional on the political system’s level of democracy, an endogenous variable. 
Following these scholars, I also conceptualize political trust as being relational in nature and thus determined by the 
interaction of citizens’ democratic value orientations and the political system’s level of democracy. I do, however, 
argue that this—scarce—literature has so far overlooked an important caveat: a political system’s level of democracy 
and citizens’ perceptions of this democratic quality are not necessarily identical, neither conceptually nor empirically. 
The “objective” level of democracy can be conceptualized as the assessment of a political system’s structure and 
processes, usually by one or more experts, as compared with some predefined benchmark standard, most commonly 
liberal democratic ideals (Geissel, Kneuer, and Lauth 2016; Morlino 2004, 2011). In contrast, citizen perceptions of 
democratic quality entail the assessment of the political system by each individual citizen based on their own 
individual ideal conception of democracy and the information they receive about the political regime (Gómez and 
Palacios 2016; Kriesi and Saris 2016; Quaranta 2018).2 Both the information and the ideals these assessments are 
based upon may differ considerably between not only individual citizens but also between citizens and experts, leading 
to divergent assessments of democratic quality. Accordingly, prior research has shown that how citizens perceive their 
political system’s democratic quality may vary greatly even within the same country (Pietsch 2014). Especially in 
autocracies, these perceptions are often heavily skewed and in fact rarely reflect the objective level of democracy 
(Kruse, Ravlik, and Welzel 2017; Mauk 2017; Park 2013, 2017; Shi and Lu 2010). Possible explanations for this 
phenomenon are the different understandings of democracy prevalent around the world, that is, citizens employing 
different standards (Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007; Shi and Lu 2010), or regime propaganda portraying the political 
system as more democratic than it really is, that is, citizens having to rely on incorrect information (Xiang and 
Hmielowski 2017). 
We must therefore qualify our expectations regarding the conditionality of the effect of democratic value 
orientations on political trust. Instead of actual level of democracy, citizen perceptions of democratic quality should 
moderate the relationship between democratic value orientations and political trust. I thus hypothesize democratic 
value orientations to have a more positive effect on political trust for citizens who view their political regime as more 
democratic, regardless of how democratic this political regime actually is. 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of democratic value orientations on political trust is contingent on citizens’ perceptions of 
the political regime’s democratic quality: democratic value orientations have a more positive effect on political trust 
if citizens perceive their regime to be more democratic. 
This implies that the relationship between democratic value orientations, perceptions of democratic quality, and 
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political trust is universal across regime types and therefore independent of whether the regime in question is 
democratic or autocratic. 
Data and Method 
To test this hypothesis on a comprehensive scale, this study employs micro-level data from six different cross-national 
survey projects: the World Values Survey (2010–2014; World Values Survey 2015), the Afrobarometer Survey (2011–
2013; Afrobarometer 2015), the AmericasBarometer (2012; Latin American Public Opinion Project 2014), the Arab 
Barometer (2012–2014; Arab Barometer 2015), the Asian Barometer Survey (2010–2012; Asian Barometer 2013), and 
the Latinobarómetro (2012–2013; Corporacion Latinobarómetro 2014). Taken together, these surveys cover more than 
one hundred democracies and autocracies across the entire globe, encompassing a wide range of democratic quality 
(see online supporting information, Table B-1, for details). For political systems in which several opinion surveys were 
conducted within the same year, these surveys are collapsed into a single country-year case. Table A1 in the appendix 
lists all country-years included in the analysis. 
The dependent variable political trust is measured as citizens’ confidence in four key regime institutions: 
government, parliament, the police, and the army (for question wordings, see online supporting information, Table B-
2). Institutional confidence is a commonly used measure of political trust in both democratic and autocratic contexts 
(e.g., D. Chen 2017; Dalton 2004; Hooghe, Dassonneville, and Marien 2015; Moehler 2009; Pietsch and Clark 2015). 
By combining confidence in four different institutions, this measure captures a broad spectrum of both legislative and 
executive as well as political and protective institutions. Factor analyses confirm the unidimensionality of the 
measurement model and, accordingly, the factor score of political trust is used in all analyses (see online supporting 
information, Table B-3).3 
For the independent variable democratic value orientations, this analysis uses a question asking respondents about 
their support for a strong leader who does not have to be elected by popular vote and has full decisional authority. As 
such personalist rule is clearly undemocratic, this study uses the rejection of this type of political rule as a measure for 
democratic value orientations. To gauge citizens’ perceptions of democratic quality, it employs an item asking 
respondents where they would place the country’s current system of government on a scale from completely 
undemocratic to completely democratic. 
The models include several individual-level control variables which have been identified in prior research as 
determinants of political trust: social trust (e.g., Kaase 1999; Zmerli and Newton 2008), performance evaluations 
(feelings of safety; for example, D. Chen 2017; Fernandez and Kuenzi 2010),4 and political interest (e.g., Wang, 
Dalton, and Shin 2006; Q. Yang and Tang 2010). The analysis also controls for standard sociodemographic variables: 
income (measured in terms of whether income is sufficient), level of education (recoded into none, primary, 
secondary, tertiary), employment status (employed/unemployed), religious affiliation (recoded into major religious 
sects), religiosity, as well as gender and age. 
As the data used here come from six different survey projects with slightly different question wordings and response 
scales and administered in heterogeneous cultural contexts, issues of cross-cultural comparability arise: do all 
respondents understand these survey questions in the same way and are their responses comparable (cf. Johnson and 
Braun 2016; Schwarz 2003; Y. Yang et al. 2010)? Although we cannot give a definitive answer to this question, 
multigroup confirmatory factor analysis finds partial scalar measurement invariance for the political-trust factor across 
individual surveys (see online supporting information, Table B-4), indicating that political trust can be measured in a 
comparable way even when using different surveys. As it is impossible to test the invariance of the single-item 
measures, robustness checks using each individual survey instead of the global combined data set serve as an 
additional countermeasure to problems of cross-cultural comparability. 
Owing to the hierarchical nature of the data, this contribution employs multilevel modeling despite being interested 
predominantly in individual-level mechanisms. Model building proceeds in two steps. In the first step, the basic model 
includes all theoretically relevant sources of political trust as well as the control variables but no interaction terms. The 
second step introduces the interaction term of democratic value orientations and perceptions of democratic quality to 
the model. This stepwise approach allows assessing the average effect of democratic value orientations on political 
trust as well as whether and how this effect is conditional on perceptions of democratic quality. 
The main analysis tests the hypothesized mechanism using the combined data set of all democratic and autocratic 
political systems. Additional analyses that separate between democracies and autocracies provide further tests of the 
universality of the proposed mechanism. To test the original hypothesis found in the literature (Hooghe, Marien, and 
Oser 2017; Huhe and Tang 2017), each section also models the interaction effect between citizens’ democratic value 
orientations and the country’s actual level of democracy. I measure this actual level of democracy by averaging a 
country’s Freedom House and V-Dem Liberal Democracy scores. Both Freedom House and V-Dem’s Liberal 
Democracy index employ a procedural 
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and liberal conception of democracy (Coppedge et al. 2018; Freedom House 2015). However, as they have slightly 
different emphases—Freedom House focuses more on individual liberties and participation rights, while V-Dem takes 
into account more strongly the rule of law and horizontal accountability5—this study combines both measures to 
comprehensively gauge a country’s democratic quality. Robustness checks include analyses using only either one of 
these measures of democracy. 
Results 
Based on the global data set of over one hundred political systems, this section explores how democratic value 
orientations affect political trust. It does so both for the combined data set covering democracies and autocracies as 
well as for subsamples covering only democracies and only autocracies, respectively. 
Beginning with the combined data set covering both democracies and autocracies, Model 1 in Table 1 initially 
shows no effect of democratic value orientations on political trust at all. Looking at only the main effect of democratic 
value orientations thus suggests that citizens’ value orientations play absolutely no role in how they view the political 
regime in which they live. This changes when introducing the interaction term of democratic value orientations and 
perceptions of democratic quality (Model 2, Table 1). For those who view their political regime as very undemocratic, 
democratic value orientations now substantially and significantly reduce political trust. In addition, the interaction term 
is positive and significant as well, indicating that the effects of democratic value orientations become more positive for 
those who perceive their political regime to be more democratic. 
For ease of interpretation, Figure 1 plots the conditional effect of democratic value orientations. It clearly 
demonstrates that, first, democratic value orientations decrease political trust for individuals who view their political 
regime as located on the undemocratic end of the regime spectrum. Second, it shows that the effect of democratic 
value orientations becomes increasingly positive when citizens view their political regime as more democratic. Third, 
for those citizens who see their regime as very democratic, democratic value orientations have a substantial and 
significant positive effect on political trust. These findings underline the relational nature of political trust. 
Furthermore, they enhance and refine the scholarship on critical citizens: instead of democratic value orientations by 
themselves, it is in fact the combination of democratic value orientations and perceptions of democratic quality that 
may lead to a decline in political trust.6 
This is not the case when using the actual level of democracy as the conditioning variable instead of citizen 
perceptions of democratic quality. Other than prior research suggested, the level of democracy does not moderate the 
effect democratic value orientations have on political trust (see Table A2 in the appendix): the effect of democratic 
value orientations on political trust does not change depending on the level of democracy.7 In addition, the effect that 
democratic value orientations have on political trust remains almost indistinguishable from zero for any level of 
democracy (see Figure A1 in the appendix): even in the most undemocratic of regimes, democratic value orientations 
do not have a significant negative overall effect on political trust.8 These findings demonstrate that the effect of 
democratic value orientations does not depend on a country’s level of democracy but rather on how each individual 
citizen views their country’s democratic quality—which may differ considerably from what experts asses the level of 
democracy to be. In fact, level of democracy and citizen perceptions of democratic quality are correlated only very 
weakly for the 131 country-years in this analysis (on the individual level: r = .07 for all countries; r = .08 for 
democracies; r = –.03 for autocracies; on the system level: r = .18 for all countries; r = .24 for democracies; r = –.10 
for autocracies), indicating that citizens seem to either know very little about their political systems or to employ very 
different standards of assessment.9 Overall, the results thus strongly suggest that the effect of democratic value 
orientations is conditional on citizens’ perceptions of democratic quality rather than the political regime’s actual level 
of democracy. 
This is further corroborated by the separate analyses of democracies and autocracies (Table 2). For both subsamples, 
the pattern from the combined data set repeats: on average, democratic value orientations have no effect on political 
trust in either democracies or autocracies. Yet, in both types of regimes, democratic value orientations decrease 
political trust for those citizens who perceive their regime as very undemocratic and increase political trust for those 
who perceive it as very democratic (Figure 2). This positive effect is, however, smaller in autocracies than in 
democracies and only reaches statistical significance for those citizens who score near the extreme positive end of the 
perceptions-of-democratic-quality scale (0.9 and above).10 Again, we cannot find a similar conditioning effect of the 
actual level of democracy (see Table A2, Figure A2 in the appendix). 
Overall, we hence find strong support for the hypothesis that citizens’ perceptions of democratic quality condition 
the effect democratic value orientations have on political trust. In contrast, the actual level of democracy of the 
political regime does not play a significant role in moderating the effect of democratic value orientations. Democratic 
value orientations decrease political trust whenever citizens—rightfully or erroneously—think their political regime is 
undemocratic. Democratic value 
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Table 1. Democratic Value Orientations, Perceptions of Democratic Quality, and Political Trust. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 0.18 (0.02) 0.22 (0.02) 
Individual-level effects     
Democratic value orientations (demval) −0.00 (0.01) −0.07*** (0.01) 
Interaction demval × demperc   0.13*** (0.02) 
Perceptions of democratic quality (demperc) 0.30*** (0.01) 0.22*** (0.02) 
Social trust 0.05*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 
Systemic performance evaluations 0.08*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 
Political interest 0.07*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 
Income sufficient 0.07*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 
Level of education (ref: none)     
(Some) primary −0.02** (0.01) −0.02** (0.01) 
(Some) secondary −0.04*** (0.01) −0.04*** (0.01) 
(Some) tertiary −0.06*** (0.01) −0.06*** (0.01) 
Employed −0.01** (0.00) −0.01** (0.00) 
Religious affiliation (ref: none)     
Catholic 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 
Protestant 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 
Muslim 0.06*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 
Buddhist 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Hindu 0.08** (0.03) 0.08** (0.03) 
Other 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 
Religiosity 0.02* (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 
Female 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Age 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 
Variance components     
Political trust (level 1) 0.05 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 
Political trust (level 2) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
AIC –28,688 –29,238 
BIC –28,468 –29,007 
N (individuals) 167,437 167,437 
N (country-years) 131 131 
Source. Afrobarometer (2011–2013; Afrobarometer 2015), AmericasBarometer (2012; Latin American Public Opinion Project 
2014), Arab Barometer (2012–2014; Arab Barometer 2015), Asian Barometer (2010–2012; Asian Barometer 2013), 
Latinobarómetro (2012–2013; Corporacion Latinobarómetro 2014), World Values Survey (2010–2014; World Values Survey 2015). 
Results of multilevel random-intercept model for dependent variable political trust. Maximum likelihood estimation. Unstandardized 
regression coefficients. Robust standard errors (sandwich estimator) in parentheses. AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = 
Bayesian information criterion. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
orientations, can, however, also increase political trust: this is the case whenever citizens—again, rightfully or 
erroneously—think their political regime is democratic. This is the case regardless of whether the political regime in 
question is democratic or autocratic. The results therefore corroborate the idea that the relationship between 
democratic value orientations, perceptions of democratic quality, and political trust is universal across regime types. 
 
Conclusion 
Although democratic ideas and values seem to have spread to almost every corner of the world, citizens in established 
democracies appear to have been turning away from core democratic values recently. Despite the lively academic 
debate revolving around the question whether democratic values are in retreat or not (Alexander and Welzel 2017; Foa 
and Mounk 2016, 2017a, 2017b; Howe 2017; Inglehart 2016; Mounk 2018; Norris 2017; Plattner 2017; Voeten 2017), 
few have paid attention to the consequences a potential decline of democratic value orientations has for political trust. 
With political trust being regarded as one of the central attitudes for the smooth functioning and stability of the 




conclusions about the systemic consequences of both a 
potential decline and spread of democratic values. 
Aiming to disentangle the elusive relationship 
between democratic value orientations and political 
trust, this contribution first conceptualized political trust 
as being relational in nature, that is, as being 
determined by the interaction between a characteristic 
of the individual citizens (the subject of political 
trust)—their democratic value orientations—and a 
characteristic of the political system (the object of 
political trust)—its democratic quality. Amending prior 
research on this relational nature, it then introduced 
citizen perceptions of democratic quality instead of the 
political system’s actual level of democracy as the 
conditioning variable based on several studies finding 
citizen perceptions of democratic quality to be 
inaccurate. It consequently proposed political trust to be 
universally determined by the interaction between 
citizens’ democratic value orientations and their 
perceptions of the system’s democratic quality. 
The empirical analysis tested this proposition on a 
data set covering more than one hundred democratic 
and autocratic regimes from all over the world, 
providing the first truly global analysis of democratic 
value orientations and political trust. Multilevel 
analyses of the complete data set as well as of subsets 
composed of only democracies and only autocracies, 
respectively, show that the effect of democratic value 
orientations on political trust is indeed contingent on 
how citizens view the regime’s democratic quality. If citizens view the political regime they live in as very 
undemocratic, democratic value orientations decrease citizens’ trust in this regime; if citizens view the regime as very 
democratic, democratic value orientations increase their trust in the regime. This is the case regardless of whether the 
regime in question is actually democratic or not; in fact, the level of democracy of the political regime has no effect at 
all on how citizens’ value orientations relate to political trust. The results thus strongly support the idea of a universal 
relationship between democratic value orientations, perceptions of democratic quality, and political trust. 
In addition to corroborating this universal relationship and the relational nature of political trust, results of this study 
point to an interesting phenomenon: how citizens view the democratic quality of their political regime appears to be 
largely disconnected from how experts rate this democratic quality. In fact, simple correlation analyses showed 
citizens’ perception of democratic quality and actual level of democracy to correlate only weakly. For example, the 
average citizen in Rwanda perceives its political regime to be what can be interpreted as a democracy with deficits (M 
= 0.69), while Freedom House and V-Dem both rate it as clearly undemocratic (combined rating of 0.18). In contrast, 
citizens in Spain appear overly critical of their political regime in comparison to how experts rate it: while the 
combined Freedom House and V-Dem rating is 0.91, the average citizen perception is only 0.62. Democratic value 
orientations therefore have about the same average effect on political trust in Spain and Rwanda, despite the former 
being a liberal democracy and the latter being a de facto single-party regime governed by an autocratic strongman. 
Although this paper could not investigate further into the reasons for the disconnect between actual level of 
democracy and citizens’ perceptions of democratic quality, its results suggest that citizens either employ very different 
standards when evaluating the democratic quality of their political regime, that is, hold conceptions of democracy that 
differ gravely from the liberal conceptions predominant in political science, or base their evaluations on information 
that is different from what experts reply upon to evaluate a regime’s democratic quality. This implies that both 
democratic and autocratic regimes may be able to manipulate the effect democratic value orientations have on political 
trust by actively engaging in shaping citizens’ conceptions of democracy and/or the supply of information about the 
political regime. Autocracies in particular appear to be making use of these tactics already. Perhaps the most prominent 
examples include China and Singapore, where governments propagate their own conceptions of “guardian” and 
“Asian” democracy, respectively—both of which decisively are 
  
Figure 1. Conditional effects plot for democratic value 
orientations and perceptions of democratic quality. 
Source. Afrobarometer (2011–2013; Afrobarometer 2015),  
AmericasBarometer (2012; Latin American Public Opinion 
Project 2014), Arab Barometer (2012–2014; Arab Barometer 
2015), Asian Barometer (2010–2012; Asian Barometer 2013), 
Latinobarómetro (2012–2013; Corporacion Latinobarómetro 
2014), World Values Survey (2010–2014; World Values 
Survey 2015). 
Multilevel regression modeling with maximum likelihood 
estimation. Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence 
intervals of conditional effect of democratic value orientations 
on political trust for varying degrees of perceptions of 
democratic quality (0.1 scale-points intervals). Model 
specifications according to Model 2 in Table 1. 
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Table 2. Democratic Value Orientations, Perceptions of Democratic Quality, and Political Trust in Democracies and in 
Autocracies. 
 Democracies Autocracies 
 Model D1 Model D2 Model A1 Model A2 
Intercept 0.18 (0.02) 0.22 (0.02) 0.19 (0.03) 0.23 (0.04) 
Individual-level effects         
Democratic value orientations 
(demval) 
−0.00 (0.01) −0.07*** (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) −0.07* (0.03) 
Interaction demval × demperc   0.13*** (0.02)   0.11** (0.04) 
Perceptions of democratic quality 
(demperc) 
0.28*** (0.02) 0.19*** (0.02) 0.34*** (0.02) 0.26*** (0.03) 
Control variables omitted from 
presentation 
        
Variance components         
Political trust (level 1) 0.05 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 
Political trust (level 2) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
AIC –22,671 –23,050 –6,687 –6,825 
BIC –22,460 –22,830 –6,489 –6,617 
N (individuals) 106,328 106,328 61,109 61,109 
N (country-years) 82 82 49 49 
Source. Afrobarometer (2011–2013; Afrobarometer 2015), AmericasBarometer (2012; Latin American Public Opinion Project 
2014), Arab Barometer (2012–2014; Arab Barometer 2015), Asian Barometer (2010–2012; Asian Barometer 2013), 
Latinobarómetro (2012–2013; Corporacion Latinobarómetro 2014), World Values Survey (2010–2014; World Values Survey 2015). 
Results of multilevel random-intercept model for dependent variable political trust. Maximum likelihood estimation. Unstandardized 
regression coefficients. Robust standard errors (sandwich estimator) in parentheses. AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = 
Bayesian information criterion. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Figure 2. Conditional effects plot for democratic value orientations and perceptions of democratic quality in 
democracies and in autocracies. 
Source. Afrobarometer (2011–2013; Afrobarometer 2015), AmericasBarometer (2012; Latin American Public Opinion Project 
2014), Arab Barometer (2012–2014; Arab Barometer 2015), Asian Barometer (2010–2012; Asian Barometer 2013), 
Latinobarómetro (2012–2013; Corporacion Latinobarómetro 2014), World Values Survey (2010–2014; World Values Survey 2015). 
Left-hand panel: democracies; right-hand panel: autocracies. Multilevel regression modeling with maximum likelihood estimation. 
Unstandardized estimates and 95% confidence intervals of conditional effect of democratic value orientations on political trust for 
varying degrees of perceptions of democratic quality (0.1 scale-points intervals). Model specifications according to Model D2 
(democracies) and Model A2 (autocracies) in Table 2. 
not defined by liberal and procedural characteristics (Han 2007; Holbig and Gilley 2010; Lu and Shi 2015).11 
Returning to the initial question of whether and how a potential spread or decline of democratic values may affect 
levels of political trust, the results thus do not allow for a definitive answer and should caution us against drawing 
general conclusions: democratic value orientations can both increase and decrease political trust in democracies as well 
as in autocracies. Regardless of regime type, what matters is how citizens view their political regime. The much-
debated “democratic disconnect” (Foa and Mounk 2016) will then only be problematic if 
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people in established democracies still perceive their regimes as delivering a high democratic quality. If, in contrast, 
citizens in established democracies have doubts about the democratic quality of the regimes they live in, democratic 
value orientations are already unlikely to serve as a source of political trust and a potential decline would likely have 
few negative consequences. At the same time, as long as autocratic regimes continue to successfully trick their citizens 
into believing they are being governed democratically, citizen trust in these regimes is unlikely to face serious 
challenges even if democratic value orientations continue to spread. 
From a conceptual point of view, these findings illuminate the relationship between democratic value orientations 
and political trust. They show that democratic value orientations as a characteristic of the individual alone barely affect 
political trust but that it is rather the combination of democratic value orientations and perceptions of democratic 
quality that matters for how much trust people extend to their political regime. This constitutes an important 
refinement of the critical-citizens perspective: democratic value orientations on their own will neither decrease nor 
increase political trust, no matter how democratic or autocratic the political regime in question actually is. Instead, they 
only do so when accompanied by the respective perceptions of democratic quality, that is, decrease political trust for 
citizens who view their regime as undemocratic and increase it for citizens who view their regime as democratic. 
Aside from clarifying the relationship between democratic value orientations and political trust, this study’s results 
also contribute to the study of political trust more generally. By showing that democratic value orientations affect 
political trust following the same patterns in both democracies and autocracies, this contribution gives some indication 
that there are universal processes that lead to the formation of political trust and that these processes work in very 
similar ways even within fundamentally different political contexts. Although we need more research to test whether 
this is also true for other common sources of political trust such as social trust, postmaterialist value orientations, or 
economic and political performance, the present findings may serve as the basis for formulating a general theory of 




Table A1. Country-Years Included in Analysis. 
Democracies Autocracies 
Argentina (2012)  
Argentina (2013)  
Australia (2012)  
Belize (2012)  
Benin (2011)  
Bolivia (2012)  
Bolivia (2013)  
Botswana (2012)  
Brazil (2012)  
Brazil (2013)  
Brazil (2014)  
Canada (2012)  
Cape Verde (2011)  
Chile (2011)  
Chile (2012)  
Chile (2013)  
Colombia (2012)  
Colombia (2013)  
Costa Rica (2012)  
Costa Rica (2013)  
Cyprus (2011)  
Dominican Republic (2012)  
Dominican Republic (2013)  
Ecuador (2012)  
Ecuador (2013)  
El Salvador (2012)  
El Salvador (2013)  
Estonia (2011)  
Georgia (2014) 
Germany (2013)  
Ghana (2012)  
Guatemala (2012)  
Guatemala (2013)  
Guyana (2012)  
India (2014)  
Indonesia (2011)  
Jamaica (2012)  
Japan (2010)  
Japan (2011)  
Lesotho (2012)  
Liberia (2012)  
Malawi (2012)  
Mauritius (2012)  
Mexico (2012)  
Mexico (2013)  
Mongolia (2010)  
Namibia (2012)  
Netherlands (2012)  
New Zealand (2011)  
Niger (2013)  
Panama (2012)  
Panama (2013)  
Paraguay (2012)  
Paraguay (2013)  
Peru (2012)  
Peru (2013)  
Philippines (2010)  
Philippines (2012) 
Poland (2012)  
Romania (2012)  
Senegal (2013)  
Sierra Leone (2012)  
Slovenia (2011)  
South Africa (2011)  
South Africa (2013)  
South Korea (2010)  
South Korea (2011)  
Spain (2011)  
Suriname (2012)  
Sweden (2011)  
Taiwan (2010)  
Taiwan (2012)  
Tanzania (2012)  
Thailand (2013)  
Trinidad and Tobago (2011)  
Trinidad and Tobago (2012)  
Tunisia (2013)  
Turkey (2011)  
Ukraine (2011)  
Uruguay (2011)  
Uruguay (2012)  
Uruguay (2013)  
USA (2011)  
USA (2012)  
Zambia (2013) 
 
Algeria (2013)  
Armenia (2011)  
Azerbaijan (2011)  
Bahrain (2014)  
Belarus (2011)  
Burk. Faso (2012)  
Burundi (2012)  
Cambodia (2012)  
Cameroon (2013)  
China (2011)  
China (2012)  
Côte d’Ivoire (2013)  
Guinea (2013)  
Haiti (2012)  
Honduras (2012)  
Honduras (2013)  
Hong Kong (2012)  
Hong Kong (2013)  
Iraq (2012)  
Iraq (2013)  
Kazakhstan (2011)  
Kenya (2011)  
Kuwait (2014)  
Kyrgyzstan (2011)  
Lebanon (2013)  
Madagascar (2013)  
Malaysia (2011)  




























Table A2. Democratic Value Orientations, Actual Level of Democracy, and Political Trust. 
 Combined data Democracies Autocracies 
 Model 3 Model D3 Model A3 
Intercept 0.28 (0.03) 0.23 (0.04) 0.29 (0.05) 
Individual-level effects       
Democratic value orientations (demval) −0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.03) −0.03 (0.03) 
Perceptions of democratic quality 0.30*** (0.01) 0.28*** (0.02) 0.34*** (0.02) 
Social trust 0.05*** (0.00) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.00) 
Systemic performance evaluations 0.08*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.10*** (0.01) 
Political interest 0.07*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 
Income sufficient 0.07*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.08*** (0.01) 
Level of education (ref: none)       
(Some) primary −0.02** (0.01) −0.03* (0.01) −0.02* (0.01) 
(Some) secondary −0.04*** (0.01) −0.05*** (0.01) −0.04*** (0.01) 
(Some) tertiary −0.06*** (0.01) −0.06*** (0.01) −0.05*** (0.01) 
Employed −0.01*** (0.00) −0.01*** (0.00) −0.01 (0.00) 
Religious affiliation (ref: none)       
Catholic 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 
Protestant 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Muslim 0.06*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 
Buddhist 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Hindu 0.08** (0.03) 0.10** (0.03) 0.03** (0.01) 
Other 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 
Religiosity 0.02** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 
Female 0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) 0.01* (0.00) 
Age 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00) 
System-level effects       
Level of democracy −0.17*** (0.03) −0.07 (0.05) −0.33* (0.14) 
Cross-level interaction       
Demval × Level of Democracy −0.01 (0.02) −0.07 (0.04) 0.05 (0.09) 
Variance components       
Political trust (level 1) 0.05 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 
Political trust (level 2) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
AIC –29,723 –23,360 –6,945 
BIC –29,462 –23,111 –6,711 
N (individuals) 167,437 106,328 61,109 
N (country-years) 131 82 49 
Source. Afrobarometer (2011–2013; Afrobarometer 2015), AmericasBarometer (2012; Latin American Public Opinion 
Project 2014), Arab Barometer (2012–2014; Arab Barometer 2015), Asian Barometer (2010–2012; Asian Barometer 
2013), Latinobarómetro (2012–2013; Corporacion Latinobarómetro 2014), World Values Survey (2010–2014; World 
Values Survey 2015). 
Results of multilevel random-slope models for dependent variable political trust. Maximum likelihood estimation. 
Unstandardized regression coefficients. Robust standard errors (sandwich estimator) in parentheses. AIC = Akaike 
information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion. 




Figure A1. Conditional effects plot for democratic 
value orientations and level of democracy. 
Source. Afrobarometer (2011–2013; Afrobarometer 
2015), AmericasBarometer (2012; Latin American 
Public Opinion Project 2014), Arab Barometer (2012–
2014; Arab Barometer 2015), Asian Barometer (2010–
2012; Asian Barometer 2013), Latinobarómetro (2012–
2013; Corporacion Latinobarómetro 2014), World 
Values Survey (2010–2014; World Values Survey 
2015). 
Multilevel regression modeling with maximum 
likelihood estimation. Unstandardized estimates and 
95% confidence intervals of conditional effect of 
democratic value orientations on political trust for 
varying degrees of level of democracy (0.1 scale-points 




Figure A2. Conditional effects plot for democratic 
value orientations and level of democracy in 
democracies and in autocracies. 
Source. Afrobarometer (2011–2013; Afrobarometer 
2015), AmericasBarometer (2012; Latin American 
Public Opinion Project 2014), Arab Barometer (2012–
2014; Arab Barometer 2015), Asian Barometer (2010–
2012; Asian Barometer 2013), Latinobarómetro (2012–
2013; Corporacion Latinobarómetro 2014), World 
Values Survey (2010–2014; World Values Survey 
2015). 
Left-hand panel: democracies; right-hand panel: 
autocracies.  
Multilevel regression modeling with maximum 
likelihood estimation. Unstandardized estimates and 
95% confidence intervals of conditional effect of 
democratic value orientations on political trust for 
varying degrees of level of democracy (0.1 scale-points 
intervals). Model specifications according to Model D3 
(democracies) and Model A3 (autocracies) in Table A2. 
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Notes 
1. On the (ongoing) debate about the existence of the so-called “democratic disconnect,” see Alexander and Welzel  
377 
(2017); Foa and Mounk (2017a, 2017b); Howe (2017); Inglehart (2016); Mounk (2018); Norris (2017); Plattner (2017); Voeten (2017). 
2. Factors other than citizens’ ideal conceptions of democracy and the information they receive may also affect their perceptions of 
democratic quality, for instance whether they voted for the winning or the losing party (Bedock and Panel 2017). These are, however, 
determinants rather than conceptual components of citizen perceptions of democratic quality. 
3. A correlation between the error terms of trust in the police and trust in the army was added to the model to improve model fit based on 
modification indices. This appears reasonable on theoretical grounds as well: both the army and the police are strictly hierarchical 
institutions associated with the use of force. Confidence in these institutions is therefore likely to be influenced by attitudes exogenous to 
political trust. 
4. Instead of the economic performance evaluations usually examined as determinants of political trust, this contribution has to rely on 
citizen evaluations of physical security as a control variable because the World Values Survey does not inquire about respondents’ 
evaluations of the national economic situation. 
5. See the online supporting information, Table B-5, for a juxtaposition of Freedom House and V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index. 
6. Robustness checks using individual survey data sets instead of the combination of all six surveys yield substantively similar results (see 
online supporting information, Table B-6 and Figure B-1). 
7. This is true even when we make only the most fundamental distinction between democracy on one hand and autocracy on the other hand 
(see online supporting information, Table B-7) or entirely remove citizen perceptions of democratic quality from the model (see online 
supporting information, Table B-8). 
8. These results remain robust when using only either Freedom House or the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (see online supporting 
information, Table B-11 and Figure B-4). 
9. Due to limitations in media freedom and propaganda efforts, the information citizens receive about the political regime is likely to be 
less accurate (more biased) in autocracies than in democracies. The considerably lower (and even negative) correlation between actual 
democratic quality and citizen perceptions of democratic quality supports this assumption as well as corroborates prior research that has 
shown citizen perceptions of democratic quality to be particularly skewed in autocracies (Kruse, Ravlik, and Welzel 2017; Mauk 2017; 
Park 2013, 2017; Shi and Lu 2010). 
10. Robustness checks using individual survey data sets instead of the combination of all six surveys yield substantively similar results (see 
online supporting information, Table B-9/Figure B-2 and Table B-10/Figure B-3). 
11. As such tactics are a relatively recent phenomenon, the correlation between actual level of democracy and citizen perceptions of 
democratic quality may have been stronger in, for example, the early 1990s, when the division between the liberal democracies of the 
West and the nondemocracies of the (ex-)Communist world was much more clear-cut than it is today. This should not, however, affect 
the basic universal relationship between democratic value orientations, perceptions of democratic quality, and political trust. 
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